Introduction
According to some world-wide circulating statistics, Germany appears to lead the league of high-wage countries by a substantial margin. These figures have been regularly cited in various competitiveness reports and in the business press, in particular in Germany. The main reason for the popularity of these data is the 'nation-states-compete' doctrine that enjoys so much influence in the business community. It is no surprise that the figures on Germany's extremely high wage costs have been widely interpreted as an indication of a severe 'competitiveness problem'. In the economic policy debate, these figures have also served as a key piece of evidence that excessive wages are at the heart of Germany's unemployment problem. This reasoning has not left academic discourse untouched. For example, Hans-Werner Sinn has recently argued in this journal: 1 "Since their rapid rise during the 1970s and 1980s, German wage costs are the world's highest. They are the cause for the mass unemployment, and they are the core of Germany's locational problem. Only if wages are priced to the market, capital comes by itself and does not have to be attracted by tax gifts."
Some Doubts
A lead in wage costs would imply that West Germany has either the world's highest productivity level to support this high wage level, or an abnormally low level of profitability due to excessive wage pressure. The evidence shows that West Germany belongs to a larger group of high-productivity economies (Maddison 1995) , while an abnormally low level of profitability is not easy to comprehend with the fact that corporate profitability is now close to the level of the "golden sixties" (Sachverstandigenrat 1997, p. 256) . This suggests that the international data on wage costs may be wrong. These data are mainly supplied by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS has established a tradition of collecting comparative statistics for wage costs and productivity in manufacturing. In Germany, these statistics have been most effectively disseminated by the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (IW), the research institute of Germany's employers' associations. The IWalso appears to have built up its own data base. We do not see a reason to object these data.
What appears to have received only little attention is the fact that those data refer only to a small sub-group of the work force: production workers in manufacturing. Up to now, comparative data on an hourly basis have been available only for this group. However, the wage costs of production workers in manufacturing may not be representative for manufacturing as a whole, save for the total economy. In Germany, production workers in manufacturing make up less than 15 per cent of all employees, and this figure is likely to be lower in countries with more employment in the service sector. In West Germany, the typical manufacturing production worker is skilled and engaged in the manufacture of specialised, high-quality goods while, for example, in the U.S. and in the U.K., the typical manufacturing production worker is less-skilled and engaged in mass production. The still-fragmentary international evidence on skill-level by sector suggests that at the end of the 1980s,26percentofthe manufacturing workforce in West Germany were less-skilled compared to 67 per cent in the U.S. and 57 per cent in the U.K. 2 Thus, it should not come as a surprise that manufacturing firm in West Germany pay, on average, higher wages to their production workers than those in the U.S. and the U.K.
New Evidence
To get a more accurate picture of wage costs in international comparison, we have constructed a new set of data on hourly wage costs in total manufacturing, the corporations sector and the economy as a whole. We define internationally comparable wage costs per hour as [W / (E • N)] • X, where W is the compensation of employees, E is the number of employees, N is the annual average hours worked per employee, and X is the common conversion factor.
The data on the compensation of employees in the OECD National Accounts statistics is the backbone of our estimate. The System of National Accounts (SNA), as codified in the revised manual of 1993, provides the only consistent and comprehensive framework for measuring costs of production in the total economy and its main sectors. Within the SNA, the compensation of employees is part of the primary distribution of income account; it refers to wages and salaries in cash and in kind plus the employer's social security contributions. In principle, the compensation of employees includes all non-wage labour costs (Lohnnebenkosten), in particular regular supplementary allowances such as those for housing, payments for sickness and injury, holiday allowances, non-monetary benefits, contributions to the public social security system, contributions to privately funded social insurance schemes, and imputed social security contributions by employers providing unfunded social benefits (Commission of the EC et al. 1993, pp. 164-8) .
Our estimate for the total economy, the corporations sector and manufacturing is based on the most recent OECD National Accounts. Because these data are usually published with a delay of several years and with different delays for individual countries, we have linked the base data to index series derived from the OECD Economic Outlook database. In the case of West Germany, we have relied solely on German national accounts statistics.
The data on the number of employees were taken from the same sources as the data for the compensation of employees. A major problem in international comparisons of hourly labour compensation is the proper measurement of the annual average hours actually worked per employee for the total economy and the corporations sector. Presently, two data sets are available, one provided by the annual OECD Employment Outlook 3 and another one provided by Maddison (1995) . Maddison makes an attempt to standardise the national statistics, including adjustments made for holidays, vacations and sickness days, while the OECD data set simply compiles data from national sources that have been constructed with different methods and with a different degree of accuracy. Germany appears to be the only country that has a fairly complete account of the annual hours worked (OECD: 1998, p. 185). Maddison does not provide separate data for employees. The non-standardised national data for OECD economies suggest that the annual average hours for all persons employed are up to 8 per cent higher compared to those data for employees only. Unfortunately, the nonstandardised data for employees are only available for 10 OECD economies. Overall, data on hours create a measurement bias of uncertain magnitude. Another problem is the choice of the proper conversion factor. Our basic conversion factor is the annual average U.S. dollar exchange rate. Because of large and persistent deviations of exchange rates from purchasing power parities, the use of the exchange rate as conversion factor may impose a substantial bias. In order to assess the possible impact of exchange rate misalignments, we have calculated the hourly compensation of employees in the corporations sector on the basis of the current exchange rates and of purchasing power parities (PPP). However, those PPP refer to total domestic demand including non-tradables. They therefore do not necessarily provide unbiased evidence for the hourly compensation of employees at the equilibrium exchange rate. Alternatively, one could use the average exchange rate for several years. However, in recent years exchange rates have deviated from purchasing power parities to such an extent that this procedure may well magnify the measurement bias. The certainly holds for the D-mark that was substantially overvalued in 1993-97. Table 1 compares our results for 13 advanced OECD economies with the evidence from the BLS statistics for the year 1997. Our estimate reveals important differences between the statistics for production workers in manufacturing and employees in the total economy and in the private sector. While wage costs for manufacturing production workers are indeed the world's highest, those for all employees are not. Rather, the western part of Germany is part of a larger group of OECD economies that have a high level of the hourly compensation of employees. This group includes Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and the United States, closely followed by France, Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands. Switzerland leads this group of high wage countries by a rather substantial margin, while Italy and the United Kingdom appear to have a significantly lower level of wage costs than other advanced OECD economies. If the level of wage costs in domestic currencies is converted with purchasing power parities instead of exchange rates, the ranking changes substantially, with the United States and Belgium clearly in the lead (table 1). We note that the relative level of the member countries of the European Monetary System, Germany included, has substantially declined in 1997 due to the partial reversal of the overvaluation of the D-mark in the preceding years. In many advanced OECD economies, wage costs differ substantially between manufacturing and the total economy, and between manufacturing as a whole and production workers in manufacturing. For example, hourly wage costs for production workers in manufacturing is only at three quarter of the total economy in the U.S. and the U.K. while it is a tenth above the total economy in West Germany (table 2) . In a number of OECD economies, most notably in the U.S., France and the U.K., the hourly wage level for total manufacturing is substantially higher than that for production workers. This implies a very substantial wage premium of non-production workers. In Germany, this wage premium is smaller.
Some Conclusions
One might be tempted to conclude that therefore Germany has no 'competitiveness problem' and that therefore 'too high wages' are not the cause of Germany's unemployment problem. We believe that this would be questionable as well. The idea that nation states compete against each other on the basis of their national wage level runs counter to conventional wisdom in international economics. Broadly speaking, conventional wisdom is centred around three concepts: Comparative advantage, purchasing power parity (PPP) and the adjustment mechanism. The theory of comparative advantage proves that countries export those goods that they can produce relatively cheap at home and import those goods that they cannot. In long-run equilibrium, trade is based on specialisation among countries along comparative advantage, while the exchange rate reflects the PPP of the respective currencies in their tradable sector. Comparative advantage and PPP are linked by the adjustment mechanism. A problem of 'competitiveness' arises if, for whatever reason, the exchange rate becomes overvalued in comparison to PPP. Overvaluation is usually accompanied by a loss of currency reserves. This requires adjustment of the real exchange rate. In the case of flexible exchange rates, adjustment implies that the nominal exchange rate has to depreciate at a constant rate of domestic inflation. In the case of fixed exchange rates, the rate of domestic inflation has to fall at a constant nominal exchange rate. A main disagreement in the literature is to what extent real economic activity is involved in the adjustment process and how persistent deviations from PPP can be, for example due to excessive speculation on currency markets and to pricing-to-the-market behaviour. Nevertheless, one basic result of conventional wisdom has remained intact for now almost two centuries: No country suffers from a permanent competitiveness problem because its absolute level of costs is 'too high'.
In Germany's economic policy debate, this reasoning has been largely pushed into the background by a new doctrine -'locational competition' (Standortwettbewerb). 4 Theoretically, itisabroadgeneralisationof theconceptoftaxcompetition.lt is argued that with growing internationalisation of economic activities, nation-states compete for internationally mobile factors of production, namely for capital. Countries with open markets, few labour market distortions, low taxes, and a good infrastructure are expected to attract more internationally-mobile capital than other countries. It is believed that the pace of globalisation has dramatically increased in the 1990s and that factor demand has consequently become substantially more elastic with respect to factor prices. In the case of labour, it is suggested that a high wage level provides firms an incentive not only to increase capital intensity at home but also to relocate production abroad. If real wages are not sufficiently flexible, unemployment is expected to increase with growing 'locational competition'. This is claimed to be true for Germany.
Empirically, this claim is flawed for two reasons: First, since unification Germany is a net-importer of capital. And second, a recent Bundesbank study (Jost 1997) shows the Germany's balance-of-payments statistics understate the inflow of FDI to Germany considerably, mainly because short-term credits between foreign multinationals and their German affiliates are not recorded as FDI, as IMF guidelines require. Moreover, there are several theoretical reasons why -in the absence of capital controls, government budget deficits, defaults risks of sovereign debtors and differences in tax systems -high-wage economies should be natural exporter of capital: First, if wages are mainly high because capital is relatively abundant, marginal productivity of capital will be relatively low, thus profitability. Hence, capital should principally flow to those countries where it is relatively scarce, that is where marginal productivity and profitability are high. Second and closely related, if international trade between high-wage and lowwage economies is based on differences in relative factor endowments, trade partners will exchange their factor services as incorporated in the goods exported. In a classic article, Mundell (1957) has shown that the same mechanism works, if instead of goods, factors are mobile. In other words, trade and factor mobility may be viewed as substitutes. Finally, if low-wage economies have a potential to catch-up to the high-wage economies, they have an incentive to smooth consumption, that is to borrow against the future in order to increase their present level of consumption. How does 'locational competition' fit into this picture? Properly understood, 'locational competition' means that national labour market institutions influence the rate of return for internationally mobile capital, positively or negatively. Clearly, international comparisons of wage costs do not capture this influence adequately. Objections can also be raised against the idea that 'too high wages' are the cause for high unemployment. This reasoning is based on a textbook model of the labour market where labour supply is rationed because the real wage is fixed at some level above the intersection of the labour supply curve and the labour demand curve. The modern literature on unemployment has largely abandoned this model in favour of the imperfect competition model (see, inter alia, Layard, Nickell, Jackman 1991 , Bean 1994 ) where on the labour market unions bargain with firms over nominal wage increases while on the product market firms have sufficient market power to set the price as a mark-up over marginal cost. Hence, a wage-setting curve replaces the labour supply curve and a price-determined labour demand curve the traditional labour demand curve of pricetaking firms. With given money supply, there is a rate of unemployment that equilibrates the desired mark-up of wages over prices by unions with the desired mark-up of prices over wages by firms. Due to costs of adjustment of the demand for capital and labour, rigidities in price and wage setting, and erroneous expectations, macroeconomic shocks are propagated to the labour market in form of wage as well as employment adjustments. Moreover, temporary macroeconomic shocks may have long-lasting or permanent effects, depending on the underlying adjustment costs and labour market structures. The empirical literature on European unemployment has identified a large set of factors that contributes to unemployment persistence, including wage bargaining systems, generous unemployment benefits and capital shortage. 5 'Too high wages' may be a concomitant of unemployment persistence, but this does not have to be the case.
